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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONGRESS AND THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST
COURT

NEAL DEVINS*
Why is it that the first Rehnquist Court (1986-1994) did not embrace
significant doctrinal innovations on abortion, school prayer, and other social
issues? Why is it that the second Rehnquist Court has both shifted its focus to
constitutional federalism and generated several important doctrinal
innovations? In answering these questions, Tom Merrill serves up a nuanced,
Rube Goldberg explanation—borrowing bits and pieces from the writings of
leading political scientists (and, for good measure, adding an innovation of his
own design).
This Comment will focus on one of the political science models that Tom
makes use of—the “external strategic actor” model. According to this model,
Supreme Court Justices take social and political forces into account when
crafting their decisions (including their decision to hear a case).1 In my view,
there is no need to look beyond this model. Differences between the first and
second Rehnquist Courts can be explained by reference to this model and
nothing else. Consequently, although I agree with much of Tom’s analysis, I
think that he has turned a fairly straightforward story into an overly complex
one. In the pages that follow, I will call attention to how it is that the Justices
have acted in response to signals sent to them from Congress and the American
people. In so doing, I will make extensive use of examples discussed by
Tom—both because his discussion of the external strategic actor model is

* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. This
essay is an elaboration of comments made at the October 4, 2002 Childress Lecture. Thanks to
Tom Merrill both for asking me to participate in the Lecture and for writing such a good paper.
Thanks also to John McGinnis for comments on an earlier draft and to Bill Hof for his hard work
in making the Lecture a success.
1. Like the so-called “attitudinal model,” the external strategic actor model assumes that
Justices seek to put into place their personal policy preferences. See Thomas W. Merrill, The
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 620
(2003). Unlike the attitudinal model, the external strategic actor model also assumes that Justices
take social and political forces into account when casting their votes. Id. at 620-21. For reasons
detailed both in Tom Merrill’s paper, see, e.g., id. at 601, and in this brief Comment (about the
significant role that social and political forces play in Rehnquist Court decision making), I think
that the attitudinal model is clearly incorrect.
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excellent and because I see my project, in critical respects, as a tweaking of his
lecture.
* * *
Before its turn to constitutional federalism, the Rehnquist Court was a
Court in search of an agenda. Although investing much energy in social issues
(for example, race, religion, and abortion), the first Rehnquist Court did little
in the way of changing the law.2 Social and political forces, especially
Congress’s support of civil and abortion rights, figure prominently in this
story. In particular, the refusal of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to sign onto
the conservative social agenda may well be tied to the signals sent to the Court
from Capitol Hill. Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas (all of whom have fairly inelastic preferences on social issues),
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have never been strong supporters of the
conservative social agenda.3 Consequently, with Congress battling the
Reagan-Bush administrations over their efforts to reshape constitutional law
through judicial appointments and Justice Department filings, it is little wonder
that neither O’Connor nor Kennedy wanted to be labeled a political lackey of
the president who appointed them.
Consider, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey4—which may be the defining case of the first Rehnquist Court.
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s decision to reaffirm Roe v. Wade5 seems
inextricably linked to Senate Judiciary Committee efforts to “make clear to
nominees that a willingness to profess belief in some threshold constitutional
values is a prerequisite for the job.”6 Specifically, the Senate Judiciary
Committee limited its sights on abortion and other social issues. It rejected
Robert Bork’s nomination because Bork, if confirmed, almost certainly would
have supplied the fifth vote needed to overturn Roe. Also, the Committee’s
“severe hazing of [Clarence] Thomas . . . served as a warning to the sitting
Justices that if they persisted down the path of seeking to overturn Roe and
2. On abortion and school prayer, the Court reaffirmed decisions that had long been the
bane of social conservatives. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (school prayer). On affirmative action,
the Court muddied that which was already murky; through a string of fractured rulings, the
Justices did little more than reject Reagan administration efforts to undo all preferences. See Neal
Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court
Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673 (1996); Neal Devins, Affirmative
Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353 (1989).
3. For the most part, Justice Byron White supported the conservative social agenda. See
Merrill, supra note 1, at 594-95. Consequently, the 1993 appointment of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
fill White’s seat cemented the social conservatives’ defeat.
4. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Stephen J. Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 121, 121-22.
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securing other conservative objectives, they could expect equivalent retaliation
of an unspecified nature.”7 Against this backdrop, it seems certain that the
Senate played an instrumental role in the defeat of the conservative social
agenda. Not only did it keep Bork off the Court, it also sent a message to
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy that the repudiation of Court decision making
on abortion, school prayer, and the like would be seen as an act of political
defiance.8 Perhaps for this reason, the Casey plurality (O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter) emphasized both the costs of “overrul[ing] under [political] fire”
and explicitly linked the Court’s “legitimacy” to people’s “confidence in the
Judiciary.”9
Beyond the appointments process, Congress pressured the first Rehnquist
Court in other important ways. On civil rights, Congress rejected Reagan and
Bush-era initiatives to limit proofs of discrimination grounded in disparate
racial impact. Most tellingly, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
overturned twelve Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of civil rights
laws. This statute, as Tom points out, “was designed to be, and was, a massive
rebuke to the Court.”10 Moreover, in 1989, Congress helped shape the face of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,11 a
decision upholding the FCC’s use of race-based diversity preferences. By
filing an amicus brief in the litigation and, more importantly, prohibiting the
FCC from reexamining diversity preferences, Congress signaled its support of
these programs (support that the Court pointed to in its Metro Broadcasting
decision).12 Finally, during its first three years, the Rehnquist Court was
constrained by lawmaker rebukes to Reagan Justice Department efforts to

7. Merrill, supra note 1, at 630-31.
8. It is also noteworthy that the appointment of stealth nominee David Souter was made, in
part, to avoid the controversy surrounding nominees—such as Bork—with a paper trail.
9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. Along these lines, even if Justices O’Connor and Kennedy were
not worried about what Congress would do to them if they signed onto an opinion overruling Roe,
it is possible that O’Connor and Kennedy either (1) saw Congress as a barometer of public and
elite opinion—so that a decision overturning Roe would isolate them from communities that they
did care about—or (2) thought that a decision overturning Roe would negatively impact on future
judicial appointments or encourage Congress to overturn Court statutory interpretation decisions.
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 631.
11. 497 U.S. 547 (1989).
12. Id. at 561, 653-66 (1989). The amicus brief was filed by the Senate. In its 1995
decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena decision, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court
repudiated Metro Broadcasting’s embrace of intermediate scrutiny review in lawsuits challenging
federal affirmative action programs. Adarand, however, did not speak to whether FCC
preferences would pass muster under strict scrutiny review. Following Adarand, the Clinton
administration concluded that FCC preferences satisfied strict review. For additional discussion,
see Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 479, 48793.
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grant tax breaks to racist schools, to disallow impact-based proofs of vote
dilution, to put an end to forced busing, and to repudiate affirmative action.13
The failure of the first Rehnquist Court to innovate doctrine and/or reach
consensus on social issues is consistent with the external strategic actor model.
In particular, because they are not truly committed to the conservative social
agenda, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are likely to be swayed by social and
political forces.14 It, therefore, is to be expected that these Justices would be
affected by the actions of Congress, especially the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Furthermore, these Justices have good reason to steer away from
cases implicating social issues. Without strong preferences on these issues,
these Justices have little reason to place themselves in the middle of a political
firestorm—especially one where their votes will almost certainly prove
decisive.15
* * *
The second Rehnquist Court’s pursuit of doctrinal innovations on
federalism-related issues is also consistent with the external strategic actor
model. In particular, social and political forces have played a significant role
in shaping the federalism revival of the second Rehnquist Court.16 First,
unlike social issues, lawmakers barely mentioned federalism in the
confirmation hearings, committee reports, or floor debates concerning any
member of the Rehnquist Court. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee
never pressed Sandra Day O’Connor about states’ rights—even though
O’Connor called attention to the fact that her “experience[s] . . . as a State
legislator[,] . . . as a [State] trial court judge[, and] . . . as a judge in the Arizona
Court of Appeals” gave her “a greater appreciation . . . [of the] important role
for the States in [our federal system].”17 Correspondingly, there are virtually

13. See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723 (1991). For this
reason, I disagree with Tom’s claim that the external strategic actor model does not explain first
Rehnquist Court decisions supporting civil rights claims. Merrill, supra note 1, at 627. Unlike
Tom, I would look beyond party control of the White House and Senate; instead, I would pay
attention to the social and political forces surrounding the Court’s civil rights decision making.
14. I offer no explanation as to why Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are not true blue social
conservatives. It may be, as Tom suggests, that Justice O’Connor honestly disapproves of some
social conservative objectives, see Merrill, supra note 1, at 634-35, whereas Justice Kennedy’s
focus is on exogenous variables, such as the impact of the Court’s abortion decision on thenPresident Bush’s 1992 reelection campaign. See id. at 635.
15. See id. at 637 (demonstrating that the Court’s shrinking docket, especially on social
issues, is likely tied to Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s penchant to deny certiorari).
16. In addition to these social and political forces, it is also noteworthy that Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy came to the Court with strong ties to states rights interests. Justice
O’Connor was a state legislator; Justice Kennedy was the son of a state lobbyist and a state
lobbyist himself. See id. at 608.
17. The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona to Serve as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the
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no mentions of federalism in interest group testimony and written
submissions.18
Second, on federalism-related issues, Congress has signaled to the Court
that it has little institutional stake in these matters and, accordingly, that there
is little, if any, institutional price that the Court will pay when invalidating
legislation on federalism-related grounds.19 In the wake of recent rulings
limiting congressional power, there has been no talk of stripping the Court of
jurisdiction, of amending the Constitution, or of enacting legislation at odds
with these decisions. Indeed, there has been virtually no talk at all; the
precedential effects of Court decisions limiting federal power are hardly ever
mentioned in the Congressional Record.20 Moreover, with the exception of
Court rulings invalidating the Violence Against Women Act and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, no more than four comments exist about the wisdom
of any of the Court’s federalism-related decisions.21 Furthermore, these
decisions played no role in the 2000 elections. Finally, Congress has shown
relatively little interest in rewriting these statutes, and when Congress has
revisited its handiwork, lawmakers have paid close attention to the Supreme
Court’s rulings, limiting their efforts to revisions the Court is likely to
approve.22
Third, Congress is held in disrepute by both the public and members of
Congress. Consider the following: As compared to 1964 (when 76% of those
polled thought that the federal government could be trusted “just about always”
or “most of the time”), 27% of those polled in 2001 thought the government
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981). O’Connor was asked four questions about federalism-related
issues. There were no federalism-related references in the Judiciary Committee report supporting
her nomination. In calling attention to the Senate’s lack of interest in federalism in past Supreme
Court confirmation hearings, I do not mean to suggest that federalism will not be a salient issue
the next time the Senate deliberates over a Supreme Court nominee. With that said, for reasons I
detail both in this Comment and other writings, I do not think that the Senate will vote a nominee
down because of her views on federalism-related issues. See infra notes 19-22, 29-33 and
accompanying text; see also Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate
Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not The Rehnquist Court, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1307 (2002) (suggesting that complaints of “conservative judicial activism” by
Senate Democrats are a rhetorical tool used to pay Republicans back for their handling of
Clinton-era nominees and, correspondingly, to limit the power of the Bush White House).
18. See Devins, supra note 17, at 1319 (discussing the nominations of O’Connor, Thomas,
Souter, and Breyer).
19. For a general treatment, see Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred
on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001).
20. Id. at 451-52 (detailing the results of LEXIS database searches).
21. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, for “Court” and
either the name of the case or relevant law for the period of one month following the date of the
decision.
22. Devins, supra note 19, at 447 n.58 (detailing the ways in which Congress responded to
the Court’s federalism-related decision making).
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trustworthy.23 Furthermore, by a 74% to 17% margin, a 1997 poll revealed
that Americans thought that members of Congress cared more about making
themselves look better than making the country better.24 Moreover, in 1992,
82% of those polled thought that people elected to Congress “‘lose touch with
the people pretty quickly.’”25 Making matters worse, Congress itself sends
signals that it is not to be trusted—especially when it comes to interpreting the
Constitution. For example, rather than sorting out the constitutionality of the
legislation it is considering, Congress sometimes enacts a fast-track provision
enabling litigants both to bypass the federal courts of appeal and to secure
automatic Supreme Court review. Over the past six years, Congress has
included expedited review provisions on several high-profile enactments,
including the Communications Decency Act, the Line Item Veto Act, McCainFeingold campaign finance legislation, census reform legislation, and library
internet filtering legislation.26 When enacting such measures, lawmakers
effectively delegate their power to interpret the Constitution to the Supreme
Court.27
More significantly, when Republicans took over both houses of Congress
in 1994 (the first year of the second Rehnquist Court), House Republicans ran
on the so-called “Contract with America.” Seeking to capitalize on widespread
voter dissatisfaction with Washington, the Contract pledged a smaller federal
government and a larger role for the states. Among other reforms, the Contract
promised item veto legislation (because Congress could not be trusted to enact
responsible spending bills), unfunded mandates reform (because Congress
could not be trusted to respect state prerogatives), and a vote on a
constitutional amendment to establish term limits (because members of
Congress quickly lost touch with their constituents).28
Riding the crest of this renewed commitment to federalism, Reagan and
Bush appointees to the Rehnquist Court had good reason to turn their attention
to states’ rights claims. Moreover, federalism was the only agenda that the
Rehnquist Court could pursue; by that time, efforts to advance conservative
23. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 348 (2001).
24. See id. at 336.
25. See id. at 337.
26. See Devins, supra note 19, at 442-43 (listing the Communications Decency Act, the Line
Item Veto Act, and census reform legislation).
27. For example, when enacting item veto legislation, William Clinger—chair of the House
committee with jurisdiction over the bill—declared that “[i]t is not really our job to determine
what is constitutional or what is not unconstitutional.” 142 CONG. REC. 6912 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Clinger).
28. While most voters did not know about the Contract, it is certainly the case that voter
disenchantment with Congress propelled the 1994 Republican takeover of both houses of
Congress. See, e.g., Ronald G. Shafer, Washington Wire: A Special Weekly Report from The Wall
Street Journal’s Capital Bureau, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1994, at A1.
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social causes “lay in shambles.”29 Finally, by replicating state criminal statutes
on carjacking, domestic violence, guns near schools, and much more, Congress
provided the Court with the fodder necessary to pursue its federalism
campaign.30
It is also noteworthy that, consistent with the external strategic actor
model, second Rehnquist Court federalism decision making has been
incremental. Initially, the Court moved gingerly—striking down relatively few
laws and doing so on somewhat ambiguous grounds. Today, however, the
Court seems more aggressive, and with good reason. State governments and
conservative interest groups have rallied behind the Court, filing briefs in
support of federalism-based claims. For its part, Congress has not cast doubt
on these decisions. Moreover, there is little reason to fear a populist backlash.
The Court remains politically popular and somewhat middle-of-the-road on
divisive social policy issues. Also, when the Court strikes down a law, it
typically leaves Congress room to revisit the issue.31 Finally, most of the
measures struck down were “position taking” statutes—that is, laws in which
legislators derive whatever political mileage they are going to get by casting a
roll call vote in support of the law.32 For example, with state laws prohibiting
both gun possession near schools and domestic violence, it was more important
to members of Congress to make “a judgmental statement” than to see to it that
the law, in fact, took effect.
* * *
In explaining differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts,
why look beyond the external political actor model? Tom Merrill offers some
explanations, but I do not think that any of them are compelling. For example,
there is simply no need to argue that Justice Scalia joined the federalism
revival in order to pursue his substantive agenda (on issues such as abortion,
affirmative action, separation of powers, and property rights). As Tom readily
acknowledges, Justice Scalia has always cast his vote with the anti-Congress
Justices on states’ rights issues (even before the emergence of the second
Rehnquist Court).33 More tellingly, Justice Scalia’s disdain of Congress seems
29. Merrill, supra note 1, at 605.
30. For quite similar reasons, Congress spurred on the Court’s anti-Congress campaign by
enacting expedited review provisions (rather than debating the constitutionality of their
handiwork). Devins, supra note 19, at 442-43.
31. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139 (2002).
32. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s
Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512-14 (2001).
33. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 617-18. For other treatments of Justice Scalia’s federalism
decisions (all arguing that Scalia’s commitment to federalism is sincere), see generally Bradford
R. Clark, The Constitutional Structure of the Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
753 (2003); John O. McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence in the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 875, 883-85 (2003).
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quite sincere. At the end of the Court’s 2000 Term, for example, Scalia made
clear that the pace of Court rulings invalidating federal statutes was likely to
quicken.
Complaining that “‘Congress is increasingly abdicating its
independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful to the
Constitution,’” Scalia warned that the “‘presumption [of Congress acting
constitutionally] is unwarranted.’”34 Finally, there is little reason to think that
Justice Scalia links his votes on federalism cases with the successful pursuit of
his substantive agenda. As Tom skillfully demonstrates, Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy have resisted this agenda through cert. denials and merits votes
on abortion and several other issues.35
None of this is to say that the Court’s turn to federalism was not a strategic
choice—a desire to move towards issues on which the Court could achieve a
consensus. There is little reason to think, however, that Justice Scalia was the
leader of this charge or, alternatively, that his pro-federalism votes were
“insincere strategic behavior.”36 For these reasons, the internal strategic actor
model does not help explain the emergence of the second Rehnquist Court.
What, then, of Tom’s claim that “membership stasis” helps explain some
of the defining characteristics of the second Rehnquist Court (for example, a
smaller case load and majority opinions containing doctrinal innovation),
whereas “membership flux” explains the first Rehnquist Court’s habit of
deciding more cases and issuing fractured opinions? Again, there is no need to
travel this road. Most significantly, the second Rehnquist Court’s turn to
federalism—especially its ability to issue majority opinions containing
doctrinal innovations—is best explained by the confluence of three factors: (a)
five members of the Court support the Court’s anti-Congress federalism
initiatives; (b) social and political forces have pushed the Court away from
social issues and towards federalism; and (c) Congress’s acceptance of the
Court’s federalism decisions has encouraged the Court to pursue states’ rights
claims aggressively. Correspondingly, there is no reason to think that the
Rehnquist Court would have approached the federalism issue differently if
there was significant turnover among the Justices who dissented in these cases
34. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000). For my money,
this speech (delivered in the heat of battle) is more probative of Scalia’s state of mind (when
striking down legislation on federalism grounds) than the 1982 article that Tom cites in his
lecture. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 610.
35. Merrill, supra note 1, at 633-38. Correspondingly, if Justice Scalia was simply acting
strategically, it is hard to fathom why he would supply the fifth vote in College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), a decision at
odds with his substantive property rights agenda. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 612-13. In light of
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s failure to champion his substantive agenda, the best
explanation for this vote is that Scalia agreed with the decision.
36. Merrill, supra note 1, at 603. To his credit, Tom explains that there is evidence on both
sides of the question of whether Justice Scalia’s behavior is strategic or sincere. See id. at 60919.
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(Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg). Likewise, there is no reason to think
that the Court would have approached these issues differently if any member
of the Rehnquist Court majority had been replaced by a Justice with identical
views on federalism-related issues.
Tom ultimately offers no hard evidence to suggest that voting patterns are
tied to “stasis,” not the convergence of personal preferences with social and
political forces. Moreover, at the start of the second Rehnquist Court, the
Court was not a Court in “stasis.” From 1990 to 1993, four Justices joined the
Court. Of equal significance, from 1987 to 1993, a group of five
“conservative” Justices served together on the Court (Rehnquist, White,
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy), but that group of Justices—as Tom readily
admits—was never able to reap the rewards of “stasis.” The reason: the
combination of personal predilections and social and political forces made it
impossible for this group to pursue the conservative social agenda.
This is not to say that “stasis” does not have its advantages. No doubt,
members of the second Rehnquist Court have a better appreciation of each
other and, consequently, should have an easier time drafting opinions that all
five can sign onto. Also, although social and political forces explain the
Court’s shift away from social issues towards federalism, “stasis” may help
explain the Court’s shrinking docket.37 Finally, the personal bonds formed
through coalition building may make it easier for that coalition to stand
together on issues of first impression, such as Bush v. Gore.38 Nevertheless,
when explaining either the demise of the first Rehnquist Court or the advent of
the second Rehnquist Court, “membership stasis” adds precious little to the
“external strategic actor” model championed in this comment.
* * *
In arguing that the defining characteristics of the first and second
Rehnquist Courts are a by-product of social and political forces, I do not mean
to suggest that either the “internal strategic actor” model or “membership flux
and stasis” are irrelevant to the task of explaining Supreme Court decision
making. In particular, although I do not think that these models are especially

37. Even here, however, a cautionary note seems appropriate. Two of the factors that Tom
points to in explaining the decline in Court opinions are only marginally related to “stasis.” The
personal preferences of Justices to write their own opinions seem very much linked to the
individual personalities of Justices, not “stasis.” Cf. id. at 643-44 (discussing how Justices’
opinion-writing preferences contributes to the Court’s shrinking docket). Also, the advent of the
cert. pool speaks more to institutional design than to “stasis.” Cf. id. at 642 (discussing how the
cert. pool contributes to the Court’s shrinking docket).
38. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For Tom’s discussion, see Merrill, supra note 1, at 650-51. On the
other hand, there are numerous counter-examples, that is, instances in which members of both the
liberal and conservative blocks have switched sides to form unusual coalitions. See, e.g., Alan M.
Dershowitz, Curious Fallout from Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A15 (describing
this phenomenon in the Court’s 2000-01 Term).
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helpful in understanding the Rehnquist Court’s turn to federalism, they may
prove useful in understanding some of the Court’s decisions. More generally,
it is certainly true that no model can explain the decision making of every
Justice and every Court. For this reason, Tom Merrill deserves a lot of credit
both for articulating a new model that helps explain Court decision making and
in trying to locate Rehnquist Court decision making in each of the dominant
models used by political scientists (as well as his freshly minted model).
At the same time, it is sometimes the case that a simpler explanation is to
be preferred to a more nuanced one. That, I think, is the flaw of The Making of
the Second Rehnquist Court. There was no need to find some kernel of truth in
each of the dominant political science models; instead, the external strategic
actor model nicely explains the defining features of both Rehnquist Courts. On
social issues, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy were unwilling to resist social
and political forces (especially confirmation politics and lawmaker efforts to
overturn the conservative social agenda).39 On federalism issues, Congress
and the American people have signaled the Justices that Court-imposed limits
on congressional power are acceptable.

39. Whenever Court decision making turns on the votes of one or two swing Justices, it is
likely that the external strategic actor model will explain the Court’s actions. Swing Justices, by
definition, have relatively weak preferences. Consequently, as was true with Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy, social and political forces often play a determinative role in shaping their decisions.

